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In previous work, the k-logistic map [Machicao and Bruno, Chaos, 27, 053116 (2017)] was introduced as a transforma-
tion operating in the k less significant digits of the Logistic map. It exploited the map’s pseudo-randomness character
that is present in its less significant digits. In this work, we comprehensively analyze the dynamical and ergodic aspects
of this transformation, show its applicability to generic chaotic maps or sets, and its potential impact on enabling the
creation of a cryptosystem that is fast, light and reliable.
Motivated by today’s huge volume of data that needs to be
handled in secrecy, there is a wish to develop not only fast
and light but also reliably secure cryptosystems. Chaos al-
lows for the creation of pseudo-random numbers by low-
dimensional transformations that need to be applied only
a small number of times. These two properties translate
into a chaos-based cryptosystem that is both fast (short
running time) and light (little computational effort). The
reliability of security in a chaos-based cryptosystem is sus-
tained by the exponentially fast decay of the correlation
of points in a chaotic trajectory. However, chaos is deter-
ministic, and as such, a sufficiently long observation of the
trajectory or its symbolic encoding can reveal its past and
future evolution, thus breaking security. That is a known
weakness of chaos in cryptography. However, this vulner-
ability can be compensated by another still not much ex-
plored the peculiar property of chaos. Look at the less sig-
nificant digits of a chaotic trajectory and surprisingly the
information content of past and future vanishes exponen-
tially fast. What we propose here is an enhanced chaos-
based cryptosystem that uses the “deep-zoom” transfor-
mation on the top of a chaotic map to improve the relia-
bility of security, but without compromising on the speed
and weight of the cryptosystem. We use low-dimensional
chaotic maps to quickly generate numbers that have little
correlation, and then we quickly (“fast”) enhance secrecy
by several orders (“reliability”) with very little computa-
tional cost (“light”) by simply looking at the less significant
digits of the initial chaotic trajectory. This paper demon-
strates this idea with rigour, making a comprehensive er-
godic characterization of this procedural strategy to create
pseudo-random numbers that can sustain a fast, light and
reliable cryptosystem.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The secrecy in chaos-based cryptosystems relies on mathe-
matical transformations that generate a trajectory whose cor-
relation decays rapidly. The correlation of chaotic trajectories
will always decay to zero after a sufficiently long time. This
is due to the mixing property that allows nearby points to be
quickly mapped anywhere in the transformation domain, and
due to the sensibility to the initial condition chaotic transfor-
mations have. In fact, the speed of correlation decay and the
sensibility to the initial conditions quantified by the Lyapunov
exponent are intimately connected1. A chaotic system with
a very large positive Lyapunov exponent is thus desirable for
cryptography2, since it allows for very rapid decay of corre-
lations. Moreover, chaotic signals can be generated by low-
powered, small area and simple integrated as well as analog
circuits operating in very large frequency bandwidths.
Cryptosystems need to perform heavy calculations. For ex-
ample, chaos-based block ciphers3–5 such as those that en-
crypt images, movies and audio employ a series of complex
mathematical transformations over too many bits of informa-
tion. If one wants a light cryptosystem that can be run in
any portable devices or that can be considered even for mas-
sive streaming, the use of real numbers with higher precision
should be avoided. To improve on the performance of chaos-
based cryptosystems, the underlying chaotic transformation
has been discretized by considering transformations operating
on an integer domain. Discretization can preserve important
ergodic properties as the mixing property and the sensibility to
the initial conditions, but might also create spurious periodic
cycles of low-period4,6, which result in correlations weaken-
ing the security of cryptosystems that rely on these transfor-
mations. Even chaotic transformations (such as the Bernoulli
shift map) acting on real numbers with finite resolution might
create spurious periodic cycles due to numerical errors.
With recent advances, it is relatively easy today to perform
numerical computation with arbitrary precision, and thus cur-
rent efficient cryptosystems can rely on maps with real arith-
metics of higher precision. However, any meaningful encod-
ing of the chaotic trajectory that allows decoding, such as
those used to create a pseudo-random number (PRN) gener-
ator or binary secret keys, would be strongly correlated with
the most significant digits of the trajectory. To create a stream
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2cipher based on chaos7, where a binary information stream is
encoded by XOR transformation to a binary secret key created
by encoding a chaotic trajectory, Gerard Vidal Cassanya8 has
proposed the use of the less significant digits of a trajectory
obtained from a higher-dimensional chaotic system of ODEs
to create the binary secret key. The idea of using the less sig-
nificant digits of chaotic trajectories has appeared before in
the work of Ref.9, however it was in Ref.8 (and other previ-
ous patent applications cited within) that less significant digits
were taken by a transformation that this work claims to be op-
timal to support a fast, light and reliable cryptosystem.
Inspired by today huge volume of data that needs to be han-
dled in secrecy, there is a desire to develop not only fast (quick
run time) and light (little computational cost) but also reliable
(highly entropic, sensitive to the initial conditions, low corre-
lation) cryptosystems. An important aspect of a cryptosystem
is its initialization. For example, one might employ a PRN
to choose parameters. Secret keys, which can be created from
PRNs, are also used to encrypt the information and represent a
core operation in any cryptosystem. Any innovative invention
that creates reliable PRNs or secret keys with optimized use
of computational resources will contribute tremendously to a
world that wants to communicate massive amounts of infor-
mation, but securely. PRNs are not only important for secrecy
in communication. It is also fundamental to the functioning
of several autonomous machines, toys, and they are essential
for several numerical algorithms. This work demonstrates that
looking at the less significant digits of chaotic trajectories is
indeed a pathway for the creation of fast, light and reliable
PRNs.
The work of Ref.10 has analyzed the dynamics and the
statistical properties of the deep-zoom transformation to a
chaotic trajectory, a transformation that takes up the less sig-
nificant digits of a real number. This transformation applied to
the Logistic map regarded as the k-logistic map10 was defined
by the less significant digits located at k digits to the right
of the decimal point. It was shown that a PRN based on the
k-logistic map has strong properties regarding statistical ran-
domness tests DIEHARD and NIST, and thus demonstrating
from a statistical perspective that the k-logistic map can sus-
tain secure cryptosystems. The k-logistic map takes advantage
of not only having trajectory points with arbitrarily large pre-
cision, and thus within principle no detectable spurious cycle,
but also on hiding the information about the most significant
digits, which could reveal information about the algorithm be-
hind the generation of the PRNs.
The interest in the present work is to understand how the
deep-zoom transformation changes a particular map ergodic
properties such as its space partition, density measure, Lya-
punov exponent, Topological and Shannon’s entropies. Our
results, mostly illustrated by how the deep-zoom transforma-
tion operates into the Logistic map are valid to generic 1D
chaotic maps or a set of numbers generated by any other pro-
cess. The deep-zoom transformation is a complementary op-
eration to chaos-based cryptosystem: we first quickly gener-
ate a chaotic trajectory by a low-dimensional map, and then
we use the deep-zoom transformation to quickly and lightly
enhance security. This is our strategy for the creation of a
fast, light and reliable chaos-based cryptosystem.
Our first result is to demonstrate that the k-deep-zoom (k-
DZ) transformation to a point x is mathematically equivalent
to iterating for k times the decimal shift map (DSM)11,12.
This map is well known, and it is since decades considered
to be a mathematical toy model to demonstrate how a shift
into the less significant digits results in strong chaos. De-
spite its tremendous appeal due to the nice way this map deals
with decimal digits, scientists working with encryption based
on nonlinear transformations have focused their attention on
other more known similar maps, such as the Bernoulli shift
map13 or the Baker’s map, instead of the DSM. The main dif-
ference is whereas the DSM operates by shifting the decimal
numbers, Bernoulli shift and Baker’s map shift the binary se-
quence encoding the real numbers of the trajectory.
Then, we demonstrate that by applying the k-DZ transfor-
mation only once to generic chaotic trajectories, the mapped
trajectories will approach a uniform invariant measure for
a sufficiently large but in practice small k, thus requiring
much less computational effort to create numbers with uni-
form statistics, a standard requirement for reliable PRNs. The
convergence to the uniform invariant measure also dictates the
convergence of the Lyapunov exponent (LE) to the Topolog-
ical and Shanon’s entropy of the mapped trajectories, indi-
cating that the transformed points have achieved the largest
sensibility to the initial conditions that is possible. Having a
trajectory for which the level of chaos is the same as the level
of entropy means that uncertainty about the past and the fu-
ture is as large as one could wish for the particular chaotic
map being considered. Moreover, all these quantities are lin-
early proportional to k, thus implying that randomness (higher
entropy) and the sensibility to the initial conditions (large LE)
can be trivially increased by the resolution with which a trajec-
tory is observed, and not by increasing a systems dimension
or by considering higher-order iterates of the map onto itself,
operations that would require computational resources.
Throughout this paper, we will show how this map amazing
properties applied to any 1D chaotic systems with finite prob-
ability measure allows for a clear path to the creation of fast
(quick run time, low number of iterations), light (little com-
putational effort, low-dimension) and reliable (uniform statis-
tics, strongly sensitive to the initial conditions, high entropy)
pseudo-random numbers or symbolic secret keys, thus sup-
porting fast, light and reliable chaos-based cryptosystems.
II. THE k-DEEP-ZOOM (K-DZ) TRANSFORMATION
AND ITS EQUIVALENCE TO THE DECIMAL SHIFT MAP
(DSM)
Given a 1D map f (x) defined in a domain [a,b] and produc-
ing an orbit O(x0) = {x0,x1, . . . ,xt} generated by the initial
condition x0, with a given invariant density ρ(x) and prob-
ability measure µ(x), such that for an interval ε ∈ [a,b] we
have that µ(ε) =
∫
x∈ε ρ(x)dx, the k-DZ transformation φk(x)
was defined in10 by
φk(x) = x10k−bx10kc , (1)
3where b c stands for the floor function. In Ref.10, and mo-
tivated mostly for practical reasons, a parameter L was con-
sidered which set the number of less significant digits for the
function φk(x). In here, we drop this definition, and assume
that L→ ∞, or is a large number.
This map can be analogously described by
φk(x) = 10k(x, mod 10−k) . (2)
φk(x) = 10kx, mod 1 . (3)
The DSM map is defined by
D(x) = 10x, mod 1, (4)
and its k-folded version (the k-th iteration of D) which we
represent by Dk is basically
Dk(x) = 10kx, mod 1, (5)
which is exactly equal to Eq. (3). Thus, the k-fold DSM map
is mathematically equal to the k-DZ transformation.
To illustrate the action of the DZ transformation, given the
value x = 0.3923481, then φk=2(x) = 0.23481.
A. The k-DZ transformation and others maps in literature
The idea of using a cryptosystem based on mod transfor-
mations that extract the less significant digits of real numbers
generated by chaotic systems was to the best of our knowledge
first proposed in Ref.9. Given a real number xn generated by
a chaotic system (discrete or continuous), this work has pro-
posed to cipher x by
Rn ≡ Axn, mod S, (6)
with A and S representing arbitrary constants.
Equation (4) can be seen as a particular case of Eq. (6), but
not of the Eq. (3) because the k-DZ transformation introduces
the extra parameter k.
Our work shows when this parameter can generate suit-
able PRNs. However, in the work of Ref.9, only the case for
A = 107 and S = 256 was studied, and without the rigour and
deepness presented in the present work to study the ergodic
and dynamic manifestations of these transformations. The
choice of S = 256, which turns the map of Eq. (6) not equiv-
alent to the DSM map, was made to organize the number Rn
into a two-dimensional gray-scale image for further process-
ing. This choice, however, is not optimal for the security of
the encryption, measured in terms of the entropy and sensibil-
ity to the initial conditions. The optimal choice, demonstrated
further, is obtained for S = 1, as in Eqs. (3) or (5). The choice
made of A as an arbitrary constant is also per se not always op-
timal to extract the less significant digits, unless this arbitrary
constant is of the form A = 10k, as in Eq. (3).
III. THE LOGISTIC MAP
The logistic map has been extensively studied over the past
years14. Since it is a well know system and that produces
typical chaotic behaviour15, we focus the application of the
k-DZ transformation to trajectory points being iterated by the
logistic map, which we refer as the k-logistic map, adopting
previously defined terminology. It is described by
f (xt+1) = bxt(1− xt) , (7)
where xt ∈ [0,1]. In Eq. (7), xt ∈ ℜ, and as such each tra-
jectory point is assumed to have infinite precision. However,
in practice, xt has finite precision, but this does not prevent
one from solving Eq. (7) by numerical means. The shadow-
ing lemma16 guarantees that numerical solutions of this map
are stable even if trajectory points have finite resolution, in
the sense that the numerical trajectory will remain close to a
true trajectory for a very long time, this time depending on the
resolution of the trajectory considered.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Phase space, partition, and topological entropy
Equation (2) is useful because it provides the key to cal-
culate the location of the partition points, where the map be-
comes discontinuous. The points of discontinuities happen at
the boundaries created by the mod function, so at multiples
of 10−k, more specifically at m10−k, for m ∈ N and m ≤ 10k.
There will be then 10k discontinuous intervals. Figure 1 show
the original Logistic map with b=4 (k = 0, left panel), and the
corresponding k-DZ transformation for k = 1 (second panel
to the right), k = 2 (third panel to the right), and k = 3 (right-
most panel).
So, the set containing the points x∗ where discontinuities
appear can be obtained by solving the following equation
x∗(m) = m10−k. (8)
We can define a topological entropy of the k-DZ transfor-
mation, which is an upper bound for the Shannon-entropy, by
the Boltzmann entropy of gas measuring the entropy of it in
terms of the number of observable states. Here, we can define
the states as being the fall of a trajectory point into an inter-
val within the partition provided by Eq. (8). Regardless of
the value of b, and actually regardless of which kind of 1D
chaotic map is used, this number is given by the number of
partition points of the k-DZ transformation and it is equal to
10k, which is also the number of possible symbolic sequences
that the k-logistic map produces. It is given by
HT = k ln(10). (9)
It is useful to compare this result with the topological en-
tropy of the original Logistic map, defined in terms of the
4FIG. 1. The k-DZ transformation applied to the trajectory points of the Logistic map. From left to right panels, for k = 0, k = 1, k = 2, and
k = 3 by using Eq. (3).
number of subintervals in its generating Markov partition, and
equal to 2o, where o∈N is the order of the partition represent-
ing the resolution of the subintervals composing the partition
(measuring 2−o in length). That results in that HT = o ln(2).
Here we see an advantage of the use of the k-logistic map to
produce efficient pseudo-random numbers in a light fashion,
so without requiring too expensive computational resources.
Assuming o and k to be of the same order, the topological en-
tropy of the k-logistic map be ln(10)/ ln(2) larger than that of
the Logistic map.
It is also worthwhile to compare the result in Eq. (9)
with the topological entropy, H(S)T , obtained by applying Eq.
(6). Defining A = 10k, we obtain that the topological entropy
equals H(S)T = k ln(10)− ln(S) for Eq. (6). Thus, the entropy
achieved in Eq. (9) for the k-DZ transformation in Eq. (3) can
only be achieved by applying Eq. (6) to that same chaotic set
if S = 1.
B. k-logistic map probability density
One of the most important characteristics of a good
PRN generator is that successive output values of it, say
u0,u1,u2, . . . are independent random variables from the uni-
form distribution over the interval [0, 1]. It was shown in 10
that as k increases the probability distribution of the map be-
comes more and more uniform. This is reproduced in Fig. 2,
in terms of the histogram (frequency) analysis. As can be seen
in this figure, for k = 0 (a) this distribution is not uniform as
it is to be expected from the Logistic map with b=4, with a
high probability of finding points close to 1 and 0. As k grows
with k = 1, k = 2, and k = 3, the distribution tends to become
increasingly uniform, as can be observed in the Figure 2(b).
In (c) we show a magnification of (b) for the region close to
zero.
C. The natural invariant measure of the k-DZ
transformation and its Shannon’s entropy
To calculate the asymptotic Lyapunov exponent of the k-
DZ transformation, which is independent on the choice of
the chaotic map, we notice that the k-DZ is piecewise lin-
ear, wherein each partition sub-interval the map has a con-
stant derivative function. Arranging the values of x∗(i) in
Eq. (8) in a ranking of crescent order and indicating it by,
i.e., x∗(m)≡ x∗i such that x∗i+1 > x∗i , each partition subinterval
comprises the interval
di = [x∗i ,x
∗
i+1[, (10)
for i ∈ N and i = [0,1, . . . ,10k−1].
The derivative of the piecewise-linear map for each sub-
interval di can be calculated by
ωi = |di|−1 = 10−k, (11)
since φk(di) = 1, where |di| represents the length of the sub-
partition di.
The evolution of an arbitrary initial probability measure
to a 1D nonlinear transformation is dictated by the Perron-
Frobenious operator. For piecewise linear systems, the
Perron-Frobenious operator can be cast in terms of a linear
system of equations operating in each subinterval of the map
partition. The k-DZ transformation takes as the initial mea-
sure generated by the nonlinear Logistic map and then ap-
plies k times the DSM. If we assume that the measure in
each subinterval of the k-DZ is uniform (which initially will
be not) and we represent it by the component [µ]i of the vector
µ (i = {1, . . . ,n}) with n = 10k, and we define the density in
each interval as given by
ρi =
µi
di
(12)
an equation for the evolution of the non-normalized density at
iteration t can be obtained17.
Z ρ ′t = ρ ′t+1, (13)
where the square matrix Z with component [Z ]i j is the re-
ciprocal of the absolute value of the slope of the map taking
the measure from the interval j to the interval i and can be
defined by a matrix with equal rows as
Z =

ω−10 ω
−1
1 . . . ω
−1
n−1 ω
−1
n
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FIG. 2. Frequency distribution curves for a) the original logistic map, b) the k−-logistic map with k = 1, k = 2 and k = 3 and parameter b = 4.
The horizontal axis shows the xt ∈ [0,1] (500 bins) and the vertical axis shows the frequency of the 104 values discarding the first 103 transient
values. The curves represent the mean and standard deviation (shaded error bar) for sequences generated over 100 random initial conditions.
c) The inset plot depicts a zoom on the windows x ∈ [0,0.03] for these 4 plots.
Equation (13), representing how the measure evolves con-
cerning only 10k intervals are valid if the measure and the
density is uniform for every sub-partition di since it has been
derived from the continuous Perron-Frobenious operator in-
tegrated over intervals where the measure was assumed to be
constant. If the initial measure is not uniform for each sub-
partition interval, as it is the case since the initial measure
was generated by the logistic map, we either should consider
the continuous operator (effectively described by an infinite
dimension matrix) or alternatively, we can adopt a much sim-
pler strategy. We take Eq. (13) and study it in the limit, when
t→ ∞.
Defining the vector d = {d1,d2, . . . ,dn} and the diagonal
matrix D = Id, the element []i j of the matrix DZ D−1 repre-
sents the percentage of the measure in the interval d j that goes
to the interval di. The matrix Z has equal rows because the
piecewise equivalent of the k-logistic map takes measure from
each interval to all others with the same proportion in each of
the intervals d j.
The equilibrium point of Eq. (13) is obtained when
Z ρ∗ = ρ∗, (14)
which means that the time invariant density is a normalized
eigenvector of Z .
The matrix Z is a stochastic matrix, since it is a non-
negative matrix and the sum of all elements in a row totals
1. This is easy to see since
∑
i
ω−1i =∑
i
di = 1. (15)
The Perron-Frobenious theorem guarantees that a square
stochastic matrix has a unique dominant real unitary eigen-
value, with all other eigenvalues smaller than 1. This means
that the density of the k-DZ transformation in the limit of
k→ ∞ is natural (it is unique), regardless of the initial prob-
ability measure that is fed into the k-DZ transformation. The
natural density can be recovered by proper normalization di-
viding ρ∗ by ∑i[ρ∗]idi so that the physical natural density in
each interval is given by
[ρ]i =
[ρ∗]i
∑i[ρ∗]idi
. (16)
This is to guarantee that the density produces the natural mea-
sure by Eq. (12).
It is also easy to see that the unique unitary eigenvalue has
associated to it a uniform eigenvector with all components
equal to a constant value c: ρ∗ = [ccc . . . ,c]T , so, the piece-
wise k-DZ transformation has a uniform density given by
[ρ]i =
c
∑i[c]di
= 1. (17)
This leads us to an invariant natural measure in each interval
that equals the Lebesgue measure of the interval, and thus
µi = di = 10−k. (18)
So, for sufficiently large k, it is to be expected that the k-
logistic map will have a uniform natural invariant density, al-
though the density of the Logistic map is not uniform for each
interval. In practice, this sufficiently large number is around
k=4, when this map generates PRNs with all the good statis-
tical characteristics for security10. Being invariant means that
any initial probability measure will eventually evolve to the
same invariant measure. Thus, the reliability of the security
for the PRNs generated by the k-DZ transformation is substan-
tially more dependable on the properties of the DSM, than on
the statistical properties of the chaotic set of points being iter-
ated by the k-DZ transformation, or also on the chaotic map
considered to initially generate the chaotic trajectory to be fed
into the k-DZ transformation. Since the invariant measure of
the k-logistic map is constant (for sufficiently large k), this
means that any encoding supported by the partition defined
in Eq. (8) will produce equiprobable symbols, this rendering
cryptoanalysis based on frequency statistics to be inappropri-
ate.
6The asymptotic Shannon’s entropy of the k-DZ transforma-
tion is therefore equal to the Topological entropy:
HS =−
n
∑
i=1
µi lnµi =−
n
∑
i=1
di lndi = HT (19)
D. The Lyapunov exponent of the k-DZ transformation
The Lyapunov exponent (LE) of the k-DZ transformation
can always be calculated regardless of the chaotic map be-
ing used as the generator of the initial measure. This is so
because the map is piecewise linear with constant derivative
everywhere (except the partition points). The Lyapunov ex-
ponent can be calculated by
λ =
∫
ln
(∣∣∣∣dφk(x)dx
∣∣∣∣
)
dµ (20)
where dµ = ρ(x)dx, represents the invariant measure of the
k-DZ transformation.
The chaotic map has its own domain of validity. This do-
main must be normalized to fit within the domain of the k-DZ
transformation. For the Logistic map, the domain is [0,1], the
same as the domain of the k-DZ transformation. Therefore, its
LE is equal to
λ =
∫ 1
0
ln
(∣∣∣10k∣∣∣)dx = k ln(10) = HT . (21)
So, we see that for a sufficiently large k, the k-DZ transfor-
mation produces a LE that approaches the topological entropy
which is also equal to Shannon’s entropy. A light cryptosys-
tem that does not require much computational effort demands
the use of transformations that can be as entropic as possible
and with the largest as possible sensibility to the initial condi-
tions (which implies in a quick decay of correlation).
When compared the LE of the k-DZ transformation in Eq.
(3 (result in Eq. (20)) with the LE of the transformation Eq.
(6) (proposed in Ref.9),
assuming A = 10k, we notice that Eq. (6) can be equiva-
lently written as
Rn = S
(
10k
S
xn, mod 1
)
, (22)
which can be rewritten as
Rn = SΦ(xn), (23)
where Φ(xn) = 10
k
S xn, mod 1. Noticing that the LE of the
function Φ(xn) is the same as the one obtained if Φ(xn) is
multiplied by a constant, then the LE of Eq. (6) is equal to
λ (S) = ln
(
10k
S
)
= H(S)T . (24)
Thus, the LE of Eq. (6) is only equal to the one of Eq. (3),
if S = 1. In the result of Eq. (24), we have assumed that
the speed of convergence of the probability density measure18
of Eq. (6) is the same as the one of Eq. (3). This is to be
expected, since the second largest eigenvalue of the matrixZ
regulating the evolution of the density measure for Eq. (3) is
the same as the one for this matrix regulating the evolution of
the density measure for Eq. (6), and both are equal to zero.
E. Enhancement of sensibility to the initial conditions of the
k-logistic map
The LE of the k-DZ transformation does not depend on the
choice of the chaotic map generating the measure. It is never-
theless interesting to understand how much chaos is enhanced
by the application of the k-DZ transformation into a chaotic
map. Considering this chaotic map to be the logistic map (Eq.
(7)), we then want to understand how much chaos is enhanced
if the DZ transformation with k = 1 is applied not to the tra-
jectory points generated by the logistic map, but to the map
itself. So, we calculate the Lyapunov exponent of the map
φk( f (xt)), whose state space (φk( f (xt))× xt ) is shown in Fig.
3. Additionally, Fig. 4 show a colored version of this previous
picture for parameters in region b ∈ [3.6,4].
This map is described by
φk( f (x)) = 10k( f (xt), mod 10−k) . (25)
Its LE can be calculated by
λ =
∫
ln
(∣∣∣∣dφk( f (x))dx
∣∣∣∣
)
dµ (26)
where dµ = ρ(x)dx now represents the measure of the Logis-
tic map.
The first derivative of the map in Eq. (25) is
dφk(x)
dx
= 10kb(1−2x), (27)
whereas its density for b = 4 is given by
ρ(x) =
pi−1
[x(1− x)]1/2 (28)
Placing Eqs. (27) and (28) in Eq. (26) and integrating over
the map domain (x ∈ [0,1]), we obtain that
λ =
∫ 1
0
k ln10+ ln4+ ln |(1−2x)|
pi
√
x(1− x) dx = k ln(10)+ ln(2),
(29)
since ∫ 1
0
ln |(1−2x)|
pi
√
x(1− x)dx = ln2.
7FIG. 3. The k-logistic map state space. From left to right panels are shown k = 0, k = 1, . . ., k = 7 using parameter b = 4. The horizontal and
vertical axes show the state space of xkt against φk( f (xt)). Each orbit contains 105 points starting from random initial conditions.
FIG. 4. The k-logistic map state space. From left to right panels are shown k = 0, k = 1, . . ., k = 7 on region b ∈ [3.6,4]. The horizontal and
vertical axes show the state space of xkt against φk( f (xt)). Each orbit contains 5×103 points starting from random initial conditions.
So, the first thing to notice is that the LE of the map in Eq.
(25) is equal to the LE of the 1-logistic map plus the LE of the
original logistic map for b = 4 (which is equal to ln(2)). This
tells us that when creating a cryptosystem based on a chaotic
map, more entropy and sensibility to the initial conditions can
be achieved by a simple inspection to the least k significant
digits, instead of doing more iterations in the chaotic map gen-
erating the initial chaotic sequence.
This analysis can be easily extended to the logistic map op-
erating under any parameter b that produces chaotic motion.
The Lyapunov exponent of the map in Eq. (25) can be cal-
culated using the time approach by
λ (b) = lim
T→∞
1
T
T
∑
t=1
ln
∣∣∣10kb(1−2xi)∣∣∣ , (30)
8which lead us to
λ (b) = k ln10+ lim
T→∞
1
T
T
∑
t=1
ln
∣∣b(1−2xi)∣∣ , (31)
and finally to
λ (b) = k ln10+λ0(b), (32)
where λ0(b) is just the Lyapunov exponent of the Logistic
map for the parameter b. Thus, here it is obvious that the gain
for sensibility to the initial conditions is trivially achieved by
just choosing a sufficiently large k.
V. PSEUDO-RANDOM NUMBERS AND SYMBOLIC
SECRET KEYS
Once the output of the k-DZ transformation φk(x) generates
real points in the unit interval, these values can be considered
directly as a pseudo-random number that can be re-scaled as
required. The security analysis of the so-called k-logistic map
PRN was analysed in10, showing high-quality pseudo-random
numbers for k≥ 4 through statistical randomness tests such as
DIEHARD19 and NIST20.
Another strategy to generate PRNs is by means of the sym-
bolic representation of the trajectory of the k-DZ transforma-
tion. Thus, a partition that is not the natural partition of the
k-DZ transformation needs to be considered. This natural par-
tition is given by d whose borders are defined by Eq. (8).
Then, for a given k, there will be 10k symbols for the natural
partition. The point φk(xi) ∈ [di,di+1] is encoded by the i-th
symbol of the alphabet (i = {0,1, . . . ,10k − 1}), represented
by si. A transformed trajectory of length L represented by
{φk(x1),φk(x2), . . . ,φk(xL)} will have the symbolic represen-
tation s = {s1,s2, . . . ,sL}, where si ∈ [0,10k− 1]. The vector
s fully represents the information about the location of the
points xi being mapped (within the resolution of the partition
cells), and therefore should be avoided for the creation of the
secret key. The partition to create a secret key should have a
minimal number of intervals, for example a binary partition
where φk(xi) < 0.5 is encoded by ‘0’ and φk(xi) ≥ 0.5 is en-
coded by ‘1’. In this way, points within xi ∈ [0,1] will be
encoded with equal probabilities for ‘0’ and ‘1’.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Cryptography relies on the application of several transfor-
mations to eliminate all existing correlations between the mes-
sage and its ciphered version. A preliminary requirement for
achieving this relies on the use of highly entropic and non-
correlated pseudo-random numbers. The sensitivity to the ini-
tial conditions property chaotic systems have is the key to this
goal. The interest today is to be able to accomplish such a task
for reliable encryption but by relying on transformations that
require little computational effort (light) and quick running
time (fast).
In this work, we characterize the properties of the so-called
the k-Deep Zoom (k-DZ) to support reliable cryptosystems
that uses pseudo-random numbers or secret keys that were cre-
ated fast and lightly. Besides the Decimal Shift Map (DSM)
is not conceptually equivalent to the k-DZ, we show that the
k-DZ is mathematically equivalent to the DSM map iterated
k times. More than that, we show that the k-fold DSM can
be rewritten into a form completely equivalent to the k-DZ
transformation. So, all the good properties of the DSM map
such as uniform statistics, high entropy, and sensibility to the
initial conditions are inherited by the k-DZ. There is a seman-
tic difference between both maps. Whereas the k-DZ trans-
formation effectively represents an algorithm that simply ex-
tracts the less significant digits of a real number, the DSM is a
map that transforms a point into another point. This semantic
interpretation of the DZ-transformation can be in the future
exploited for the creation of dedicated electronic chips oper-
ating at the hardware level that only work with less significant
digits, thus potentially bringing the encryption process to the
physical level. We show that the entropy and the Lyapunov
exponent is linearly proportional to k. This means that the
trivial and light task of peeking onto the sequence of less sig-
nificant digits positioned k digits to the decimal floating-point
is sufficient to drastically increase the entropy and therefore
the uncertainty past and future numbers, at a minimal compu-
tational cost.
Several of the properties of the k-DZ transformation depend
only on the map itself, not on the chaotic system being consid-
ered as the generator of the original trajectory being encoded,
or any other set of numbers being generated by any other pro-
cess (e.g. stochastic processes). Thus, one might wonder why
to use the k-DZ transformation into a chaotic set of numbers
after all? The reason is that chaotic trajectories have several
advantages. They are easy to be generated and do not require
the use of higher-dimensional systems, in both digital or ana-
log domains, they require less algorithmic complexity, less-
power electronics, less CPU dedication and can be generated
at impressive large bandwidths. Chaos, however, is determin-
istic and correlation does decay quickly, but not as quickly as
one would wish. The additional application of the k-DZ trans-
formations to chaotic trajectories fast and lightly enhances the
already existing wished properties of chaos to cryptography.
A transformation that optimizes essential ingredients to a se-
cure cryptosystem, but with minimal computational effort.
Our strategy to create pseudo-random numbers or secret
keys requires the use of a chaotic system whose simulated tra-
jectory is guaranteed to be chaotic for a long period, and that
can be additionally generated using minimal computational
resources. For this reason, the Logistic map is a good candi-
date. The k-DZ transformation is then applied a single time
to this stable chaotic trajectory. Our claim is that this strategy
quickly generates secure and light PRNs. Another strategy
to generate secure PRNs, which might increase the computa-
tional cost to some extent, was proposed in Ref.13, where an
approximate true trajectory of the Bernoulli map is calculated
directly using real algebraic numbers.
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